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This paper considers the practices of UK listed companies with regard to the provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables. Following the work of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), the 
concept of an abnormal provision for credit losses is put forward; this is where the provision 
for credit losses is greater or less than what could have been expected for a given increase in  
gross trade receivables. Our contention is that this abnormal provision for credit losses is 
indicative of earnings management activity. Therefore, we test to determine the factors that 
may be influencing the extent of the abnormal provision for credit losses.  
 
We found evidence of under provisioning; with companies under-providing by 10% relative 
to the increase in gross trade receivables, this was significantly different from 0% i.e. the 
absence of under-provisioning. Additionally, we found that on average, the level of provision 
for credit losses was equal to 6% of trade receivables and 15% of net income attributable to 
ordinary shareholders. In relation to the factors that cause this under provisioning, the results 
show: 
 Where the board of directors is comprised of an increasing proportion of independent 
non-executive directors, there is significantly less under provisioning activity. 
 Where executive level managers receive remuneration contingent upon earnings 
performance, there is significantly more under provisioning activity. 
 However, numerous other factors that are usually associated with earnings 
management exhibited no relationship with the abnormal provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables.  
 
This study adds to existing earnings management research by considering a single attribute of 
discretionary accruals. It is only a relatively recent phenomenon that companies have 
routinely disclosed their credit loss provisions. Many companies only began the practice of 
disclosure in 2005 as part of the transition to international GAAP. However, the results were 
disappointing with low Adj R
2
s and many of the hypothesised variables proving insignificant.  
 
On average, abnormal under provision for credit losses on trade receivables was found to 
exist amongst FTSE 350 companies, however we were unable to satisfactorily explain the 
existence of the abnormal under-provision from the perspective of the earnings management 
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This paper considers the practices of UK listed companies with regard to the provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables. Results on the average level of trade receivables and 
provisioning activity are presented. Then, following the work of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), 
the concept of an abnormal provision for credit losses is put forward; this is where the 
provision for credit losses is greater or less than what could have been expected for a given 
increase in  gross trade receivables. Our contention is that this abnormal provision for credit 
losses is indicative of earnings management activity. Therefore, we test to determine the 
factors that may be influencing the extent of the abnormal provision for credit losses. The 
results suggest that although we were able to show evidence of abnormal under-provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables, we could not confirm that the variables that have been 
found to influence earnings management (more broadly defined) could be applied in the 
singular measure in this instance.  
 
The importance of trade credit as a method of corporate financing is widely documented, 
with empirical evidence suggesting that trade receivables account for between 5 to 30 per 
cent of the total assets of European companies (Van Der Wijst and Hol, 2002). Post the 2008 
financial crisis, both private and corporate credit risk remain elevated. With the 
intensification of the sovereign debt crisis across Europe during 2011 and 2012, 
macroeconomic uncertainty and credit risk have increased further. EFMA (2012) states that 
79 per cent of credit risk manager respondents anticipate a renewed recession across Europe 
during 2012, leading to increased restrictions in trade credit and expected increases in credit 
delinquencies.  
 
Companies provide for anticipated losses on trade receivables through a specific provision for 
credit loss on trade receivables (IAS 39: S.58-59), commonly referred to as the provision for 
doubtful receivables or provision for bad debts. In an environment of such elevated credit 
risk, any reduction in this provision or failure to augment the provision relative to an increase 
in total gross trade receivables could be considered to be suspect. Indeed, any reduction or 
failure to augment this provision generally serves to inflate overall earnings. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) identified the large impact that the provision for credit losses can have on 
reported earnings: they noted that the average provision for credit losses is equal to 20% of 
average reported earnings and that discretion over the bad debt provision equates to up to 4% 
of income. They concluded that, while on its own discretionary provision for credit losses 
may appear immaterial, it can in conjunction with other discretionary accruals, help managers 
to achieve target income.  
 
Prior empirical studies, ranging from Healy (1985), Jones (1991) to Dechow et al (2011) 
have examined in great detail the existence, frequency and magnitude of earnings 
management activity, primarily in the context of discretionary accruals. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) identify the need for further research with regard to earnings management 
through singular accrual measures such as the provision for bad debts. However, excepting 
the research of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Ricci (2011), the authors are not aware of 
additional extensive research that has examined the manipulation of the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables from an earnings management perspective, in a European or IFRS 
compliant financial reporting context.  
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Our main research objectives are:  
1. To quantify the existence and magnitude of the provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables amongst FTSE 350 companies.  
2. To quantify the existence, direction and magnitude of abnormal provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables amongst FTSE 350 companies. 
3. To develop a model that examines the determining factors that help to explain the 
extent of the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables amongst FTSE 
350 companies.  
 
This study adds to existing earnings management research by considering a single attribute of 
discretionary accruals. It is only a relatively recent phenomenon that companies have 
routinely disclosed their bad debt provisions. Many companies only began the practice of 
disclosure in 2005
1
 as part of the transition to international GAAP. Hence, now that the 
practice is well established, it is opportune to consider its impact. In considering the 
determinants of under or over provisioning, it is envisaged that useful insights will be gained 
that may be of help to auditors and financial regulators.  
 
We found evidence of under provisioning; with companies under providing by 10% relative 
to the increase in gross trade receivables, this was significantly different from 0% i.e. the 
absence of under-provisioning. In relation to the factors that cause this under provisioning, 
the results indicate: 
 Where the board of directors is comprised of an increasing proportion of independent 
non-executive directors, there is significantly less under provisioning activity. 
 Where executive level managers receive remuneration contingent upon earnings 
performance, there is significantly more under provisioning activity. 
 However, numerous other factors that are usually associated with earnings 
management exhibited no relationship with the abnormal provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised  in the following sequence: section two considers the 
previous literature, theoretical basis of the paper and sets out the basis for the hypotheses that 
will be tested. In section three, the research methodology is detailed and the key 
methodological decisions are explained. The results of the empirical research are discussed in 
section four, while, section five details our overall conclusion.  
 
2.0: Previous Literature 
 
This section will briefly introduce the concept of earnings quality and earnings management, 
leading to a discussion on measuring earnings management. Then, the current financial 
reporting regulations governing disclosures of the provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables are reviewed, followed by the previous studies  that have concentrated on the use 
of the provision for credit losses to manage earnings. In the next section, the main theoretical 
frameworks that are commonly used to explain earnings management behaviour are 
described. Finally, the hypotheses that form the basis for this study are developed. 
 
                                                 
1
 For example, GSK began to disclose their bad debt provision in 2005 while Vodafone began the practice in 
2002.  
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2.1: Earnings Quality and Earnings Management 
 
This study investigates the practices of FTSE 350 companies in their provisioning for credit 
losses on trade receivables. It is an activity that requires considerable judgement. As a 
consequence, there is scope for potential manipulation of the provision with a resultant 
impact on reported earnings. In situations where the provision for credit losses does not 
reflect the underlying economic events affecting a firm, then the reported earnings could be 
considered to be of lower quality.  
 
The concept of earnings quality is documented extensively in prior literature, with Ayres 
(1994) stating that earnings quality was examined as early as the 1930’s, whereby the true or 
underlying value of a security could be determined through careful analysis of an entity’s 
financial statements to indicate whether a company should be trading in excess of or below 
its current market value. According to Ayres (1994), a focus on the degree of permanence in 
reported earnings became a principal measure of earnings quality during the early 1970’s.  
 
The concept of earnings management is very closely linked with earnings quality. Earnings 
management comprises income smoothing behaviour but also refers to the intentional 
structuring of disclosure or investment decisions with the bottom line impact in mind (Ayres, 
1994). Bricker et al (1995) posit that reported earnings are of the highest quality when they 
are most reflective of underlying events and conditions. Moreover, Duncan (2002) asserts 
that management must often undertake subjective estimates with regard to losses on loans or 
trade receivables that directly impact earnings quality and that if managers smooth or manage 
earnings through estimates that are either too liberal or conservative, there is a significant risk 
that such earnings may be viewed as lower quality earnings by financial statement users. In 
supporting Duncan (2002), Schipper et al (2003) determine that investors consistently attach 
higher price multiples to earnings patterns that are supported by high quality earnings and 
that the magnitude of any earnings management activity directly impacts the quality of 
earnings. 
 
While acknowledging that accounting flexibility is a primary mechanism through which 
earnings management takes place, Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that the elimination of 
all accounting flexibility would render earnings useless as a measurement of economic 
performance. Colson et al (2010) suggest that firms may utilise such flexibility to provide a 
clearer indication of their financial performance, rather than to mislead investors. 
Additionally, Srivastava (2008) determines that firms utilise flexibility in revenue recognition 
rules in order to convey value relevant information to investors and not to engage in earnings 
management.   
 
Accrual accounting, which is utilised to disrupt cash flow patterns in order to compensate for 
issues of both timing and recognition (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), is most contentious in the 
area of earnings management. Although accounting driven accruals are often identified as a 
primary mechanism through which earnings management may take place (Dechow                
et al, 1995), it is argued that the use of accrual accounting in the determination of earnings 
results in long run earnings patterns that are closely correlated with returns (Degeorge et al 
1999). Healy and Wahlen (1998) also contend that current earnings, which are indicative of 
management judgement, are value relevant and are better indicators of future cash flow 
performance than current cash flows.    
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2.2 Measures of Earnings Quality  
 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) state that earnings quality may be measured through indicators 
that include the ratio of cash from operations to income, changes in total accruals or the direct 
estimation of discretionary accruals through accounting fundamentals. Palliam and Shalhoub 
(2003) define earnings quality as a measure of the predictability of future earnings while 
Schipper et al (2003) also posit that higher quality earnings have a signalling effect that 
indicates the sustainability of an earnings pattern. Bellovary et al (2005), in identifying the 
provision for doubtful receivables as a singular measure of earnings quality, also contend that 
earnings quality refers to the stability, persistence and lack of variability in reported earnings 
while Mohammady (2010) supports these assertions in stating that persistence, predictive 
value, feedback value and earnings smoothness can all be employed as indicators of earnings 
quality.  
 
As a result of the relationship between earnings management activity and earnings quality, 
the detection of earnings management has been the focus of multiple empirical studies to 
date, with the work of Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), and Jones (1991) in the development 
of specific models to test for the existence, frequency and magnitude of earnings 
management. Subsequent empirical studies, including those of Sweeney (1994), Dechow et al 
(1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002), and Dechow et al (2011) have attempted to refine prior 
models in the detection of earnings management and to identify the primary determinants of 
earnings management practice generally.  
 
2.3: The Provision for Credit Losses – Current Regulation (2011) 
 
The current regulation governing the provision for credit losses (or impairment of financial 
assets) is set out in IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. Section 58 
of IAS 39 prescribes that an entity should reduce the carrying amount of a financial asset 
either directly or through the use of an allowance account where objective evidence of 
impairment exists at the reporting period end. Section 59 of IAS 39 also states that, inter alia, 
the following constitute objective evidence of impairment:  
 Significant financial difficulty of the obligor. 
 A breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest or principal payments.  
 Where the creditor grants concessions to the debtor that it would not consider in the 
normal course of business. 
 Adverse changes in the payment status of debtors (e.g. delayed payment). 
 National or local economic conditions that correlate with defaults on the assets in a 
group.  
IFRS 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosures, describes the regulation surrounding the 
disclosures that should be made in relation to the provision for credit losses.  
 
While the regulation attempts to reduce the possibility for manipulation to a minimum (IAS 
39 effectively eliminated the use of general provisions, IAS 39 IG E4.2),  a degree of 
judgement is still required to determine if ‘objective evidence of impairment’ exists. The 
relevant sections of IAS 39 became effective for accounting periods beginning on 1 January 
2005 (IAS 39, section 103). Prior to that date, the regulation governing the provision for 
credit losses  was less restrictive.  
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2.4: The Provision for Credit Losses – Previous Studies 
 
Notwithstanding the changes in financial reporting regulation referred to in the previous 
paragraph, the limited number of previous studies into the use of the provision for credit 
losses may provide some useful insights. At the outset, there is a significant literature gap 
with regard to empirical studies that examine the level of provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables, in the context of earnings management. This is possibly explained as a result of 
prior research utilising a portfolio or combination approach in examining the combined level 
of total discretionary accruals.  
 
In utilising the provision for doubtful debts as a proxy for earnings management activity and 
predicting the provision for doubtful debts in the absence of earnings management, 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) determine that firms manage their earnings through the choice 
of income decreasing accruals when income is extreme. McNichols and Wilson (1988) also 
determine that discretion in the provision for bad debts ranges from 1 – 4 per cent of income 
for firms with extreme income and that exercising discretion over the provision for bad debts, 
combined with alternative discretionary accrual measures, can facilitate the achievement of 
target income where annual earnings targets are within a 10 to 15 per cent growth range. 
 
In developing a multivariable earnings signal framework, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) 
identify disproportionate annual changes in trade receivables relative to revenue and 
disproportionate annual changes in the provision for doubtful receivables relative to trade 
receivables as fundamental indicators of earnings quality, suggesting that firms with 
inadequate provisions for doubtful receivables are expected to experience future depressed 
earnings as a result of increased provisions. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) also determine that 
while the aforementioned receivables and doubtful receivables signals are relatively weak in 
unconditioned analysis, both signals are statistically significant and value relevant during 
high inflation years, indicating the importance of contextual or conditioned analysis. Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) also suggest that there are adverse implications arising from inadequate 




Ricci (2011) compares the receivables and receivables related accounts of companies subject 
to U.S. SEC enforcement actions against those of a positive control group. Utilising the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, manipulating companies are paired against non-manipulating 
companies within the same industry grouping. In determining that trade receivables 
manipulation varies by industry type, Ricci (2011) finds that receivables are inflated via the 
provision for doubtful receivables amongst companies in the Information Technology sector. 
 
As already outlined however, there is limited prior research with regard to the manipulation 
of the provision for credit losses on trade receivables in a European or IFRS compliant 
financial reporting context. Given the identifiable literature gap, it is hoped that the 
completion of this study somewhat addresses this imbalance.  
 
2.5: Earnings Management - Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Earnings management activity, of which the flexibility inherent in the provision for credit 
losses is a subset, can be viewed primarily within the confines of the signalling, agency and 
positive accounting theoretical frameworks. While several sources of literature contend that 
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there are significant differences between agency theory and signalling theory, Morris (1987) 
concludes that both theories are consistent, with considerable overlap in many instances.  
 
Signalling theory describes the actions of parties who are engaged in a transaction within the 
context of asymmetric information. Morris (1987) states that higher quality firms will utilise 
accounting information disclosure to indicate to shareholders that they are not utilising 
accounting flexibility to their detriment, or that they are not utilising such flexibility to the 
same extent as other firms. Whereas, lower quality firms utilise accounting methods that 
conceal their inferior quality. The clear inference from these assertions is that those firms 
who engage in earnings management are predisposed towards those signalling motives of 
inferior quality firms (Morris, 1987).  
 
Positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) provides significant grounding for 
the existence of earnings management practice. Positive accounting theory attempts to 
explain and predict accounting practices. The theory suggests, and empirical evidence 
confirms, that key variables including size, the debt to equity ratio and the existence of a 
management level compensation plan impact the propensity towards earnings management 
within a firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
 
Conceptualised primarily by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory defines the 
relationship between the principal and agent, owner and manager of a firm. Palliam and 
Shalhoub (2003) state that the risk differential between principals and agents creates a 
problem in the principal - agent relationship. While the responsibility for the management of 
earnings rests with the agents of a firm, the methods undertaken to manage earnings are not 
equally desirable from a principal’s perspective (Palliam and Shalhoub, 2003). The principal 
can limit divergence by the agent from their desired perspectives through both incentives and 
monitoring costs. In the context of this agency relationship, Palliam and Shalhoub (2003) 
further posit that in order to comply with consensus earnings forecasts, to achieve the desires 
of the principal or to project a smooth earnings path, agents will manage earnings through the 
acceleration or deferral of either revenue or expenses or through accounting operations.   
 
2.6: Hypothesis Development 
 
There have been numerous empirical studies that have considered the determinants of 
earnings management. While many of these studies have not been in the context of the 
provision for credit losses, nonetheless they will inform our study and permit us to develop a 
number of hypotheses. These hypotheses will be subsequently tested in the context of the use 
of the provision for credit losses to manage earnings.  
 
2.6.1: Hypothesis 1: The use of the provision for credit losses to manage earnings 
 
Both McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) provide some evidence 
of the use of the provision for credit losses to manage earnings. This study will test the 
assertion that FTSE 350 companies are managing their earnings through the provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables. Utilising the approach developed by Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993), an abnormal provision exists where the relative change in the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables is disproportionate to the relative change in total gross trade 




. Consistent with Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), this study attaches a similar 
interpretation to this measure; where abnormal under (over) provision is defined as earnings 
inflation (deflation) activity. Throughout this study, this measure is employed as the primary 
measure of earnings quality and proxy for earnings management activity. Specifically: 
 
H1 – Ceteris paribus, the mean abnormal provision for credit losses (as defined in section 3.1) 
is not equal to zero.  
 
If the abnormal provision for credit losses was equal to zero, then any increase in trade 
receivables should be matched by an equal increase in the provision for credit losses. An 
abnormal provision of less (greater) than zero implies that a change in trade receivables 
results in a smaller (greater) change in the provision for credit losses. In the context of this 
study, instances where the mean abnormal provision is less (greater) than zero may provide 
evidence of earnings inflation (deflation) activity.  
 
2.6.2: Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3: Earnings expectations and the impact on the 
provision for credit losses 
 
Hypotheses two and three are conceptualised in the context of earnings management activity, 
via the change in the provision for credit losses, in an environment where firms are under 
pressure to meet the expectations of institutional investors, analysts and other capital market 
participants. Payne and Robb (1997) determine that firms manage their earnings in order to 
meet or comply with analysts’ forecasts.  
 
Kasznik (1999) provides evidence consistent with the findings of Payne and Robb (1997), 
determining that managers utilise positive discretionary accruals to inflate earnings when 
earnings would otherwise, in the absence of inflation, fall below prior management forecasts.  
 
Habib and Hansen (2008) state that the importance placed upon meeting analysts’ forecast 
benchmarks has increased in recent years. Lopez and Rees (2002) determine, via empirical 
analysis, that 65 per cent of sample firms met or exceeded analysts’ forecasts during the years 
post 1992. Lopez and Rees (2002) also find that the negative response of stock market 
participants to not meeting forecasts is significantly greater, in absolute terms, than the 
response to beating forecasts and that meeting analysts’ forecasts is a more powerful variable 
in the explanation of returns than the annual profit or loss performance of a firm. 
 













                                                 
2
 Throughout this paper the concept of the ‘abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables’ is used. 






Earnings – EPS 
Surprise % 
Abnormal Change 
in Provision for 
Credit Losses On 
T/Receivables 
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H2 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between analyst consensus EPS growth 
forecasts and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
Those firms that exhibit the greatest negative abnormal change in the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables by under-providing (thereby inflating earnings) are those firms 
that have the greatest growth in EPS targets to achieve. These are the firms that are under the 
greatest pressure to meet the expectations of the capital markets.  
 
H3 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between a company’s earnings (EPS) 
surprise and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
Those firms that exhibit the greatest negative abnormal change in the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables by under-providing (thereby inflating earnings) are those firms 
that have experienced the greatest earnings surprise. These are the firms that beat the market 
expectations by the greatest amount (but did so through earnings inflation activity).  
 
 
2.6.3: Hypothesis 4, 5 and 6: Contractual relationships and the impact on the provision 
for credit losses 
 
Hypothesis four, five and six consider the effect that contractual relationships between the 
firm and the providers of debt finance and between the firm and management have on the 
extent of the abnormal provision for credit losses (i.e. on the propensity of the firm to manage 
earnings). Healy and Wahlen (1998) state that contracting motives arise where management 
compensation contracts are utilised to align external stakeholder and management incentives 
or where lending contracts are utilised to prevent against managerial level engagement in 
activity to the detriment of a firm’s creditors.  
 
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1998), the balance of empirical evidence suggests that 
managers will utilise accounting judgement to inflate earnings where bonus plans and 
contractual compensation incentives are linked to earnings performance. Moreover, Healy 
(1985) determines that firms who specify a limit on their bonus award schemes are more 
likely to report accruals resulting in the deferral of income when the bonus limit is reached, 
indicating that there is an incentive to report earnings that will result in receipt of the 
maximum bonus level, but not beyond such a level.  
 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) determine that chief executive officers reduce research and 
development spending during their final years in office, possibly to report more positive short 
run earnings, with their final compensation contracts linked to these earnings upon departure. 
Gaver and Gaver (1998), supporting the findings of Balsam (1998), found that managers are 
rewarded for undertaking accounting choice that positively impacts income. Chen (2006) also 
asserts and finds, in a Taiwanese context, that those firms engaged in earnings manipulation 
have a stronger incentive to avoid reporting net losses or depressed earnings in order to 
secure high levels of bonus payments, when compared with a sample of non-manipulating 
firms. Clearly, the majority evidence from these studies (Table 1 overleaf) suggests that 
executive level compensation is a primary determinant of earnings management activity.  
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Table 1 – Executive Level Compensation and Earnings Management 
Author Subject Earnings Management  R  
Healy (1985)  Bonus Plans Limited Earnings Mgmt.  + 
Healy and Wahlen (1998) Bonus Plans Earnings Inflation  + 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) R&D Expenditure  Earnings Inflation  - 
Balsam (1998) Mgmt. Compensation Earnings Inflation  + 
Gaver and Gaver (1998) Mgmt. Compensation Earnings Inflation  + 
Chen (2006) Bonus Payments Earnings Inflation  + 
Where R indicates the relationship between the subject and earnings management activity.  
 
Prior research has also investigated the relationship between an increasing risk of breaching 
debt covenants or lending contracts and earnings management activity. Chen (2006) suggests 
that firms are more likely to be successful in loan or funding applications where they have 
higher net incomes and gearing ratios that are well below the industry accepted threshold. 
Dechow et al (1996) state that a primary determinant of earnings management is the desire to 
raise external financing at a low cost and to avoid any debt covenant restrictions.  
 
In examining firms that have violated lending contracts, DeFond and Jimbalvo (1994) 
determine that firms accelerated their earnings one year prior to the breach of debt covenants. 
Additionally, Sweeney (1994) determined that debt covenant violators typically engage in 
income increasing accounting policy changes; however this engagement is generally post 
debt covenant violation.  
 

















H4 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the existence of a bonus plan 
and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
Those firms that exhibit the greatest negative abnormal change in the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables by under-providing (thereby inflating earnings) are more likely to 









in Provision for 
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executive bonus plans it is suggested that this may not be a distinguishing factor hence 
hypothesis five is developed (below).  
 
H5 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the proportion of incentive 
(bonus) specific executive level remuneration and the abnormal change in provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables.  
 
It is hypothesised that there is a greater incentive on those firms to inflate earnings (by a 
negative abnormal change in the provision for credit losses on trade receivables) where a 
greater proportion of executive remuneration is comprised of incentivised related payments.  
 
H6 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the difference in the level of 
gearing of a firm and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
It is difficult to  obtain information on firms that are close to (or actually) breaking debt 
covenants. However, it is suggested that companies with increasing levels of gearing are 
more likely to engage in  earnings inflation activities through a negative abnormal change in 
the provision for credit losses on trade receivables 
 
2.6.4: Hypothesis 7, and 8: Operating margins and the impact on the provision for 
credit losses 
 
Operating margins are a key metric used by investors when assessing the performance of a 
company. Investors and capital market participants also place significant emphasis upon 
reported revenue according to Anderson and Yohn (2002), who conclude that when there are 
irregularities with a firm’s financial statements, investors are more concerned with revenue 
recognition and margin misstatements than alternative reporting issues. Furthermore, revenue 
restatements result in significantly more adverse stock returns compared with alternative 
accounting restatements (Anderson and Yohn, 2002). Zhang (2006) determined that firms 
with the following characteristics were more likely to manage or manipulate revenues:  
 Higher growth  perspectives  
 Higher operating margins 
 Outstanding analyst sales forecasts 
 Higher accounting policy flexibility in revenue recognition  
The  higher growth  perspectives variable has been captured by hypothesis 2, which considers 
the impact of consensus EPS growth expectations on the abnormal provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables. Outstanding analyst sales forecasts are difficult to access for all 
members of the FTSE 350, hence this variable is not included. Accounting policy flexibility 
in revenue recognition is both an unreliable and subjective assessment in the context of this 
study. However, the impact of operating margins as highlighted by Zhang (2006) is 
hypothesised in this study, as follows (overleaf): 
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H7 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the difference in the gross 
margin of a firm and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
Those firms that are experiencing increasing gross margins are more likely to exhibit a 
negative abnormal change in the provision for credit losses on trade receivables (by under-
providing for credit losses and thereby inflating earnings). However, in many firms the 
impairment for credit losses expense is reported as an operating expense and not as part of 
cost of sales hence  hypothesis eight is presented below.  
 
 
H8 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the difference in the net margin 
of a firm and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
It is hypothesised that there is a greater incentive on those firms to inflate earnings (by a 
negative abnormal change in the provision for credit losses on trade receivables) where a firm 
is reporting an increase in its net margin.  
 
2.6.5: Hypothesis  9,  10,  11 and 12: Corporate governance structures and the impact 
on the provision for credit losses 
 
Empirical research has identified a strong link between effective corporate governance 
structures and a reduced level of earnings management activity, as summarised in Table 2 
overleaf. Dechow et al (1996) find that poor oversight through weak governance structures is 
an important determinant of earnings manipulation. Chen (2006) determines that Taiwanese 
firms who are engaged in earnings manipulation have a lower concentration of INEDs on 




Margin    
Variables 
Difference in 




in Provision for 
Credit Losses On 
T/Receivables 
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Table 2 – Corporate Governance Structures and Earnings Management 
Author Subject Earnings Management  R  
Dechow et al (1996)  Weak Governance Increased Manipulation  + 
Beasley (1996) (+) INEDs to Board Reduction in Fraud   - 
Peasnell et al (2005) (+) INEDs to Board Reduced Earnings Inflation  - 
Sebahattin and Harlan (2009) Strong Governance Reduced Earnings Mgmt. - 
Where R indicates the relationship between the subject and earnings management activity.  
 
Additionally, Beasley (1996) determines that the proportion of external director concentration 
to the board of directors for firms experiencing financial statement fraud is lower when 
compared with non-fraud firms and that the composition of the board, rather than audit 
committee presence, is a more important mechanism for reducing the likelihood of financial 
statement manipulation.  
 
Although the Corporate Governance Code is twenty years old, there persists a level of non-
compliance. Grant Thornton (2011) found that only half of all FTSE 350 companies were 
fully compliant with the Combined Code during their 2011 review. Therefore,  the number of 
governance non-compliance issues variable has been introduced as a measure of the strength 
of governance within a firm.  
 
























H9 – Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the proportion of INEDs to the 





INEDS to Total 
Board  
INEDs to Audit 
Committee 
Abnormal Change 
in Provision for 
Credit Losses On 
T/Receivables 
 
No. Of Audit 
Committee 
Meetings  
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Those firms that have a lower proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board 
of directors (INEDs), and thereby less effective oversight, will find it easier to report a 
negative abnormal change in the provision for credit losses on trade receivables (by under-
providing for credit losses and thereby inflating earnings). As the proportion of non-executive 
directors decreases, the abnormal change in the provision for credit losses becomes more 
negative – both variables should move in the same direction.   
 
H10 – Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the proportion of INEDs to the 
total audit committee and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables.  
 
The logic is the same as the previous hypothesis, except that in this instance, the composition 
of the audit committee is considered. In many firms, the key accounting estimates and 
judgements are discussed at the audit committee meetings and not at the main board meeting. 
However, Lin et al (2006) was unable to support this assertion in relation to earnings 
management.   
 
H11 – Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the number of audit committee 
meetings held during the financial year and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables.  
 
The contention with this hypothesis is that as the audit committee holds more meetings, then 
its members are able to engage in more effective oversight, thereby limiting the opportunity 
for earnings management (through negative abnormal changes in the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables). Therefore, as the number of meetings held is lower, the 
abnormal change in the provision for credit losses becomes more negative – both variables 





H12 – Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the number of firm specific 
governance non-compliance issues and the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on 
trade receivables.  
 
The greater the number of specific corporate governance non-compliance issues, the less 
effective the corporate governance structures are within a firm. Therefore, there is greater 
opportunity for earnings management (through negative abnormal changes in the provision 
for credit losses on trade receivables). As the number of non-compliance issues increase, the 
propensity to manage earnings increases and the abnormal change in the provision for credit 
losses becomes more negative – both variables should move in opposite directions.  
 
2.6.6: Hypothesis 13 and 14: Auditor oversight and the impact on the provision for 
credit losses 
 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) determine that large audit firms provide higher quality audits, 
exhibit reporting conservatism and are more aggressive in constraining the earnings 
management activity of their clients. Krishnan (2003) showed that clients of non-specialist 
auditors exhibit elevated levels of discretionary accruals when compared with clients of 
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specialist auditors while also suggesting that the use of a Big 6
3
 auditor with industry 
specialist knowledge can enhance the credibility of accounting information.  
 
Jordan et al (2010) found that managers of companies audited by small audit firms 
manipulated their earnings to generate EPS values consistent with user reference points and 
that Big 4 audit firms are more likely to be effective in constraining the efforts of their clients 
in earnings manipulation. In addition, Lin et al (2006) suggest that higher audit fees from 
either audit specific or non-audit services reduce auditor independence and therefore impair 
overall audit quality. In contrast, Frankel et al (2002) find that there is a negative association 
between audit specific fees and earnings management indicators. Table 3 (below) summarises 
these findings.  
 
Table 3 – Auditor Type, Auditor Remuneration and Earnings Management 
Author Subject Earnings Management  R  
Francis and Krishnan (1999)  Large Audit Firms  Reduced Earnings Mgmt.  - 
Frankel et al (2002)   (+) Audit Fees  Reduced Earnings Mgmt.   - 
Lin et al (2006) (+) Audit Fees Increased Earnings Mgmt.   + 
Jordan et al (2010)  Small Audit Firms Increased Earnings Mgmt. + 
Where R indicates the relationship between the subject and earnings management activity. 
 















H13 – Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between auditor type and the abnormal 
change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
Auditor type is a categorical variable, in this study a firm that is audited by one of the Big 4 is 
assigned ‘1’ whereas a firm that is audited by a non-Big 4 audit firm is assigned ‘0’. Firms 
that are audited by a Big 4 auditor (‘1’s) have less opportunity for earnings management 
(through negative abnormal changes in the provision for credit losses on trade receivables) 
and the abnormal change in the provision for credit losses becomes less negative – both 
variables should move in the same direction. 
 
H14 – Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between audit specific fees and the 
abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
                                                 
3
 Big 6 audit firms in 2003 have subsequently reduced to Big 4 audit firms at the time of this study.  
 
Auditor    
Variables 
Auditor Type 
Audit Specific  
Fees  
Abnormal Change 
in Provision for 
Credit Losses On 
T/Receivables 
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The literature is not clear on this issue. However, our contention is that as the audit fee 
increases, the auditor can dedicate more resources to the audit thereby constraining the 
abnormal under-provision activity of their clients. Thus, as the audit fee increases the 
abnormal change in the provision for credit losses becomes less negative – both variables 
should move in the same direction. 
 
Having considered the extant literature and set out the basis behind the hypotheses to be 
tested, the next section describes how the testing was undertaken.  
 
3.0: Research Design 
 
The research approach adopted in this study uses a measure of earnings management, the 
abnormal provision for credit losses, that is directly consistent with Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993). The sample is selected from the FTSE 350 Index, excluding banks, insurance and 
financial related institutions. Recent changes to accounting standards require that companies 
must now routinely disclose information on the provision for credit losses and its movement 
over the financial period. This section describes, in more detail, the methods employed to 
measure the independent variables, select the sample, gather the data and test the hypotheses 
(as detailed in the previous section).  
 
3.1.: Measuring the abnormal provision for credit losses 
 
The measurement of earnings management is a difficult activity. There have been numerous 
models developed, particularly to measure discretionary accruals. The original discretionary 
accruals model was developed by Jones (1991). This was later modified (now called the 
Modified Jones Model) by Dechow et al. (1995) and remains one of the most widely 
acknowledged and utilised models for measuring discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) 
studied each of these models and determined that the Modified Jones Model provided a more 
effective and accurate test of earnings management. Similarly, further studies which 
examined the effectiveness of the various models confirmed this finding (Hedstrom and 
Tounkara, 2011). 
 
However, while the modified Jones model is deemed to be the more effective and accurate 
measure of discretionary accruals internationally; it still possesses a number of significant 
limitations which is reiterated throughout academic research. Thus, there have been 
numerous calls made for enhanced models to be developed. In their study, Bernard and 
Skinner (1996) appeal for “methodologically more reliable ways of measuring earnings 
management”.  
 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) identify the need for further research with regard to earnings 
management through singular accrual measures such as the provision for bad debts. In an 
effort to answer McNichols and Wilson’s (1988) call, this study uses a single measure as a 
proxy for the existence of earnings management – the abnormal provision for credit losses on 
trade receivables.   
 
The abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables exists where the change in the 
provision is disproportionate to the change in gross trade receivables. For example, where 
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gross trade receivables for a given company doubles, it is expected that the provision for 
credit losses should double also. If this is not the case, then the company is deemed to be 
under or over providing for credit losses with a resultant impact on the reported profits. While 
there may be sound underlying reasons in an individual company for a difference to exist, 
across large samples these should average to close to zero.  
 
The measure of abnormal provision for credit losses used in this study is: 
 
Where: AbProv = the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables 
 Provt = the provision for credit losses in the current period (t-1 is the prior period) 
 GTRt = gross trade receivables in the current period (t-1 is the prior period) 
 
Utilisation of this measure is directly consistent with Lev and Thiagarajan (1993). Where 
AbProv is negative, this indicates an abnormal under-provision, while a positive value 
indicates an abnormal over-provision for credit losses. An abnormal under-provision has the 
effect of inflating earnings. Throughout this study, this measure is employed as a proxy for 
earnings management activity. 
 
3.2.: Sample Selection 
 
The initial total sample of 350 companies relates to the composition of the FTSE 350 Index in 
June 2012. Consistent with prior studies, including Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), banks, 
financial and financial related institutions are specifically excluded, given the significant 
variance in their capital structures. Moreover, Collins et al (1995) already document the 
existence of earnings management through abnormal provisioning activity within banks, 
further supporting their exclusion from this study.  
 
Companies within sectors classified as Banks, Equity Investment Instruments, Financial 
Services, Life Insurance, Non-Equity Investment Instruments, Nonlife Insurance, Real Estate 
Investment and Services and Real Estate Investment Trusts were therefore specifically 
excluded. Ruspetro PLC, admitted to the FTSE 350 Index during early 2012, had not 
published any financial statements as at 07
 
June 2012 and was therefore excluded from the 
study. After exclusion of these companies, the total sample consisted of 241 companies.  
 
A preliminary examination of their financial statements resulted in the exclusion of a further 
31 companies, due to the omission of information with regard to the provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables or where summary receivables were presented, that comprised 
significantly of VAT and other non-trade components. The sample is now made up of 210 
companies.  
 
Outliers in this study are identified with reference to the dependent variable (AbProv). Six 
companies were identified as having extreme abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables relative to the total sample. This resulted in their exclusion from all subsequent 
analysis and reduced the final sample population to 204 companies. In a number of these 
cases, the companies involved had a near zero provision for credit losses in the previous 
period compared to a much larger provision in the current period (due to a large growth in 
gross trade receivables) giving a very large, close to infinity, abnormal over provision.   
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Table 4 – Sample Selection Refinement Summary 
    Total    
  Initial FTSE 350 Population  350   
  Exclusion of Financial Firms -108   
  Annual Report Unavailable -1   
  Insufficient Provision Information  -31   
  Outlier Firms -6   
  Final Sample 204   
        
 
 
3.3.: Data Sources 
 
The data for this study was collected from a combination of the individual annual reports of 
the companies in the sample and the Thomson One Banker databases. While the Thomson 
One Banker databases are used extensively throughout this study, in-depth analysis of 
individual annual reports and disclosure notes is also necessary to collect firm specific data 
relating to trade receivables, the provision for credit losses on trade receivables, along with 
contractual, governance and auditor related variables. The latest available annual reports for 
all companies were downloaded from the Investor Relations sections of companies’ websites 
in June 2012. These annual reports cover the 15 month period from 31 Dec 2010 to 31 March 
2012; however 81% of the sample had year ends between 31 Dec 2011 and 31 March 2012. 
The source for data underlying each significant measure used in this study is detailed in   
Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5 – Data Sources for Data Measures 
Data Measure Source Data Measure Source 
Gross Trade Receivables AR Prop. Of INEDS to Total Board AR 
Provision For Credit Losses On 
T/Rec 
AR Prop. Of INEDS to Audit Comm.  AR 
Consensus EPS Growth (%) TO # Of Gov. Non Compliance Issues AR 
Earnings (EPS) Surprise (%) TO # Of Audit Committee Meetings AR 
Existence of Bonus Plan AR Auditor Type AR 
Exec. Incentive Remuneration AR Revenue AR 
Difference in Gross Margin (%) TO Audit Specific Fee(s) AR 
Difference in Net Margin (%) TO Stock Price Performance  TO 
Difference in Gearing (%) TO Stock Beta Value TO 
Change in Trade Rec. Days TO Total Assets TO 
 
In Table 6 above, AR refers to the annual report of a company while TO refers to the Thomson One Banker 
database.  
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3.4.: The independent variables 
 
According to our hypotheses, the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables 
may be related to a number of variables. From prior empirical research, it is possible to arrive 
at measures for these independent variables. Table 6 (below) identifies these various 
hypotheses along with the measure or proxy used and the previous studies supporting each 
hypothesis respectively. It should be noted that in the interests of brevity and readability, the 
number of supporting studies has been limited to one per measure/proxy.  
 
Table 6: Hypotheses, Variable Measures/Proxies and Expected Relationship 





















































Zhang (2006) Negative 
Proportion of 














Lin et al (2006) Positive 
Number of 
governance    
non-compliance 
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Number of non-compliance issues 
raised in annual report 
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Dechow et al 
(1996) 
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Number of audit 
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Number of audit committee meetings 
held in current period 
AUDIT 
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Lin et al (2006) Positive 
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Table 6 (continued): Hypotheses, Variable Measures/Proxies and Expected Relationship 












3.5.: Compliance with OLS regression assumptions 
 
The utilisation of OLS regression analyses requires compliance with its underlying 
assumptions, including correct model specification, normal distribution of the error 
observations ( i) and the absence of multicollinearity between the independent explanatory 
variables. Misspecification in previous earnings management models is well documented, 
while attempts at misspecification mitigation procedures have often reduced test power 
(Dechow et al, 2011). The accrual reversal framework of Dechow et al (2011) provides an 
apparent solution for mitigating model misspecification, yet there is no generally identified 
optimal model for detecting or examining earnings management activity.  
 
The multivariate regression model employed in this study for examining the determinants of 
earnings management is consistent with prior research; however, given the lack of results that 
will be described in the next section, the problem of misspecification and omitted variables is 
a risk. With regard to the other assumptions of OLS regression analyses, the results of all 
procedures verify compliance with these underlying assumptions.  
 
Having described the research approach, the next section will detail the results of the 
research.  
 
4.0: Results and Discussion 
 
The results of our analysis are presented in this section. Thereafter, the implications of the 
results are discussed in the context of current regulation and existing empirical research. 
 
4.1: The abnormal provision for credit losses (H1) 
 
For the period analysed, the mean relative increase in gross trade receivables is measured at 
12.0 per cent, with a corresponding mean relative increase in the provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables of only 2.1 per cent. The mean level of abnormal provision is therefore 
measured at -9.9 per cent (Table 7 overleaf). 
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Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics for Magnitude of Abnormal Provision (N=204) 
Magnitude of Abnormal Provision Mean* 
Std 
Error*  
Min*  Max* Skew 
Abnormal Provision for Credit Losses (%)  -9.90 2.67 -141.60 135.30 -0.10 
Change in Gross Trade Receivables (%)  12.00 2.23 -85.20 163.56 1.80 
Change in Provision for Credit Losses (%) 2.10 2.36 -73.28 191.20 2.10 
 







The mean level of abnormal provision indicates that there was an average under-provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables of 9.9 per cent, with a standard error of 2.7 per cent 
suggesting that on average, companies under-provided for credit losses relative to the change 
in trade receivables. This is significantly different (p value < 0.001) from 0 per cent, which 
was the hypothesised level of abnormal provision for credit losses. 
 
 
Of the total sample of 204 FTSE 350 companies, 138 or 67.7 per cent exhibited a negative 
abnormal provision for credit losses (i.e. a relative under-provision) during the period. The 
skewness value of -0.1 also indicates that the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables variable is normally distributed. Additionally, we found that on average, the level 
of provision for credit losses was equal to 6% of trade receivables and 15% of net income 
attributable to ordinary shareholders. The previously cited study of McNichols and Wilson 
(1988) determined that the provision for credit losses was equal to 20% of reported earnings, 




Previously, the following hypothesis was set out:  
H1 – Ceteris paribus, the mean abnormal provision for credit losses (as defined in 
section 3.1) is not equal to zero.  
This can now be accepted, in fact, we can state that the mean abnormal provision for credit 
losses is less than zero
5
. A possible explanation is that there is an economy of scale effect – 
as receivables increase companies get better at collection. However, the economic conditions 
over the period of this study may indicate otherwise. Indeed, in the following year (2012) to 
the reference year (the majority of the financial statements relate to 2011), European 
corporates expected an even stronger deterioration in credit risk (Atradius, 2012).  
 
In addition, as part of this study, the level of trade receivables past due but not impaired was 
collected (where disclosed). The mean level of trade receivables past due, but not impaired 
amounted to £138.8 million, compared with a mean of £128.0 million in the previous period, 
representing a relative increase of 8.4 per cent. Moreover, the average rate of provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables amongst the 204 FTSE 350 companies declined to 5.98% 
(of trade receivables) from 6.41% (of trade receivables) in the previous period. Despite the 
categorisation of non-impairment, there has been a clear increase in the level of receivable-
credit risk amongst the 204 FTSE 350 companies, rendering the identified negative abnormal 
provision for credit losses (under-provision) all the more suspect. With such widespread 
                                                 
4
 There have been numerous changes in regulations since 1988. However, the most significant is the 
‘downgrading’ of prudence in favour of fair value – for example, general provisions are now much harder to 
justify. 
5
 On average, as trade receivables increase the provision for credit losses does not increase to the same extent. 
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relative under-provision, the downside risk arising from instances of elevated credit losses in 
the near term is significant. Should credit risk deteriorate further, as anticipated, there is an 
underlying risk of increased write-offs and a negative impact upon corporate earnings as a 
result of increased provisioning activity - given the current level of abnormal under-provision 
amongst the companies analysed. 
 
While no consistent approach to credit risk assessment was noted amongst the 204 FTSE 350 
companies, significant divergence from the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 was noted 
throughout. Of the final sample of 204 FTSE 350 companies, only 98 provided detail 
regarding trade receivables past due and specifically impaired in a manner consistent with 
IFRS 7, while 178 provided detail regarding trade receivables past due and not impaired in a 
manner consistent with IFRS 7. The possible explanation for this lack of disclosure is the 
state of flux that exists with IFRS 7. While the relevant paragraph of IFRS 7 (paragraph 37) 
was part of the original standard, applicable to accounting periods beginning from 1 Jan 
2007, the standard has had numerous changes, deletions and amendments. It is not difficult to 
appreciate how this has led to considerable divergence in disclosure practice.  
 
The impact of such divergence and the problem of information asymmetry provides ample 
opportunity for manipulation of the provision for credit losses on trade receivables in the 
context of earnings management. Extensive regulation of the provision for credit losses on 
trade receivables by the IASB is clearly impractical, as the impairment of trade receivables is 
inherently subjective and unique to each company or sector type. However, enhanced 





4.2: Factors influencing the abnormal provision for credit losses (H2 to H14) 
 
The aim of these hypotheses was to examine the applicability of previously identified 
determinants of earnings management to the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables amongst FTSE 350 companies.  
 
4.2.1: Results of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 14 
 
Table 8 – Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Independent Variables 
  FREQ 1 FREQ 0 
β3 Existence of Bonus Plan (1 = plan in place) 202 2 
β12 Auditor Type (1 = Big 4 auditor) 198 6 
 
  
                                                 
6
 In a separate analysis, we found that 90.1 per cent of the variation in the change in provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables is explained by factors beyond the relative change in gross trade receivables.  
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Table 9 – Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Independent Variables 
Determinants of Earnings Mgmt. Mean 
Std 
Dev  
Min  Max Skew 
β1 Consensus EPS Growth (%)*  34.91 1.56 -63.48 1760.00 8.72 
β2 Earnings (EPS) Surprise (%)*  0.33 0.21 -185.00 97.00 -4.24 
β4 Executive Incentive Remuneration  0.36 0.18 0.00 0.89 -0.41 
β5 Difference in Gearing (%)* 0.09 5.77 -23.44 21.00 0.21 
β6 Difference in Gross Margin (%)* 1.03 6.63 -18.39 51.89 3.73 
β7 Difference in Net Margin (%)* 0.04 10.31 -72.95 41.28 -2.20 
β8 Proportion of INEDs to the Total Board* 53.95 0.10 28.57 80.00 0.08 
β9 Proportion of INEDs to Audit Comm.* 98.00 0.07 50.00 100.00 -5.48 
β10 No. Of Governance Non Compliance Issues 0.74 1.09 0.00 8.00 2.68 
β11 No. Of Audit Committee Meetings 4.32 1.58 2.00 14.00 2.39 
β13 Audit Specific Fee(s)  0.08 0.06 0.01 0.44 1.85 
All Percentages (Indicated*) are converted to Percentage Point Scores through Multiplication – (X 100)  
 
OLS univariate regression analysis was conducted to examine the extent of the relationship 
between the primary dependent variable (abnormal change in the provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables) and each of the previously identified 14 independent variables. This was 
initially undertaken with the full sample of 204 companies, with the analysis subsequently 
restricted to the 138 identified under-providers, as these are the companies that are most 
likely to be using the provision for credit losses to manage their earnings. The equation used 




Where:   
AbProv = abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables (proxy for earnings 
management). 
βXi = each of the 14 independent explanatory variables.  
β0 = intercept.  
 = regression error term.  
 
The results of simple linear regression analysis are contained in Table 10 (overleaf):  
  
AbProv = β0 + βiXi +  
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Table 10 – Simple Regression Analysis Results 
   Full Sample (N= 204) 
AbProv Negative 




Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
2 β1 Consensus EPS Growth (%)  - -0.023 0.181 -0.015 0.266 
3 β2 Earnings (EPS) Surprise (%) - 0.188 0.151 0.156 0.161 
4 β3 Existence of Bonus Plan - 0.046 0.866 -0.134 0.508 
5 
β4 Executive Incentive 
Remuneration  
- -0.245 0.094** -0.001 0.985 
6 β5 Difference in Gearing (%) - -0.011 0.022* -0.007 0.100** 
7 β6 Difference in Gross Margin (%) - 0.004 0.369 -0.009 0.039* 
8 β7 Difference in Net Margin (%) - 0.003 0.203 0.002 0.347 
10 
β8 Proportion of INEDs to the 
Total Board 
+ 0.543 0.036* 0.483 0.037* 
11 
β9 Proportion of INEDs to Audit 
Committee 
+ 0.246 0.524 -0.143 0.641 
12 
β10 No. Of Governance Non 
Compliance Issues 
- -0.008 0.748 -0.001 0.981 
13 
β11 No. Of Audit Committee 
Meetings 
+ 0.008 0.655 0.008 0.627 
14 β12 Auditor Type + 0.010 0.524 0.377 0.022*** 
15 β13 Audit Specific Fees  + -0.270 0.555 -0.189 0.628 
*** This is a spurious result as auditor type is not a distinguishing feature of the sample.  
* = Significant at the 5% level ** = Significant at the 10% level 
 
As indicated in Table 10, based upon the full sample, 10 of the 13 independent variables 
exhibit no significant influence on the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on 
trade receivables. However, the bolded p-values, indicate that both the difference in gearing 
and the proportion of INEDs to the total board variables have a significant (5% level) 
influence on the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables, with 
the signs of the coefficients consistent with those hypothesised in both instances. 
Additionally, the executive incentive remuneration variable exhibits a significant (10% level) 
negative relationship with the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables.  
 
When the sample is restricted to the 138 under-providers (see Table 10), the difference in 
gross margin and the proportion of INEDs to the total board variables significantly influence 
the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables at the 5% level. The 
difference in gearing variable also exhibits significance at the 10% level. The signs of the 
coefficients of all significant variables are also consistent with those hypothesised. While the 
auditor type variable exhibits an apparent significant relationship (0.022), this result is 
disregarded as this variable is not normally distributed. Only three of the 138 abnormal 
under-providers are audited by a non-Big 4 auditor, therefore the variable does not exhibit 
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any variability. On further analysis a t-test of the mean abnormal provision where a non-Big 4 
auditor was used and the mean abnormal provision where a Big 4 four auditor was used could 
not prove that the means were different.  
 
While only a small number of the hypothesised variables exhibited a significant relationship 
with the dependent variable, a multiple regression model was developed which attempts to 
show how the movement in the abnormal provision for credit losses can be explained by each 
of the previously identified 13 independent variables.  
 
Regression One: Thirteen Hypotheses Regression (N=204) 
Regression one consists of the full sample of 204 FTSE 350 companies and tests all thirteen 
hypotheses as outlined below. 
 












Table 11 (overleaf) contains the results of the analysis. The model exhibits only limited 
explanatory power, with a regression significance p-value of 0.088. The adjusted R square 
value of 0.037 indicates that the model only explains 3.7 per cent of the variation in the 
direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. In addition, only three 
variables exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the direction of abnormal 
provision for credit losses on trade receivables: the executive incentive remuneration (5%), 
difference in net margin (5% level), and the proportion of INEDs to the total board (5% 
level). Moreover, the positive coefficient of earnings surprise variable is contrary to that 
hypothesised, while the p-values of several variables highlight their insignificance (see Table 
11 below). 
 
Regression Two: Seven Hypotheses Regression (N=204) 
Regression two consists of the full sample of 204 FTSE 350 companies and tests seven 
hypotheses, having eliminated the most insignificant variables, as indicated in the equation 
below.  
 








AbProv = β0 + β1 EPS GROWTH+ β2 EPS SURPRISE + β3 BONUS                           
      + β4 REMUN + β5 GEARING + β6 GROSS MARGIN  
                             + β7 NET MARGIN + β8 INEDS BOARD + β9 INEDS AUDIT 
                             + β10 GOV NON COMP + β11 AUDIT MEET 
                             + β12 AUDITOR + β13 AUDIT FEES +   
   
 
 
                 
                     
    AbProv = β0 + β1 EPS GROWTH + β2 EPS SURPRISE + β4 REMUN  
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The results contained in Table 11 indicate a marked improvement in the power of the model. 
The F-stat and associated p-value show that the model has explanatory power with a 
regression significance p-value of 0.006. The adjusted R square value of 0.063 indicates that 
the model explains just 6.3 per cent of the variation in the abnormal provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables. Despite the marked improvement in the explanatory power of the 
model, no additional variables exhibit statistical significance in determining the change in the 
abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. The proportion of INEDs to the 
total board and executive incentive remuneration variables exhibit significance at the 5% 
level. The analysis was also repeated on the restricted sample of 138 identified under-
providers;   however the results did not differ to those reported for the full sample.  
 
 
Table 11: Multiple Regression Results 
Coefficient (Predicted Sign +/-) Regression 1 Regression 2 
β1 Consensus EPS Growth (-)  -0.021 (0.242) -0.022 (0.216) 
β2 Earnings (EPS) Surprise (-) 0.234 (0.099)*** 0.224 (0.098)*** 
β3 Existence of Bonus Plan (-) 0.092 (0.742)  
β4 Executive Incentive Remuneration  (-) -0.342 (0.029)** -0.322 (0.029)** 
β5 Difference in Gearing (-)  -0.007 (0.100)*** -0.008 (0.100)*** 
β6 Difference in Gross Margin (-)  -0.005 (0.186) -0.005 (0.220) 
β7 Difference in Net Margin (-) 0.005 (0.049)** 0.005 (0.061)*** 
β8 Proportion of INEDs to the Total Board (+) 0.549 (0.046)** 0.514 (0.046)** 
β9 Proportion of INEDs to Audit Committee (+) 0.081 (0.856)  
β10 No. Of Governance Non Compliance Issues (-) 0.012 (0.684)  
β11 No. Of Audit Committee Meetings (+) 0.001 (0.920)  
β12 Auditor Type (+) -0.052 (0.749)  
β13 Audit Specific Fees (+)  0.298 (0.536)  
R Square 0.099 0.095 
Adj R Square 0.037 0.063 
F Stat  1.599 (0.088) 2.946 (0.006)* 
P-Values in parentheses  
* = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
*** = Significant at the 10% level  
 
Acceptance or rejection of the research hypotheses (H2 – H14 inclusive) is undertaken relative 
to the results of univariate regression analysis and multiple regressions one and two. H2 – H14 
are conceptualised with regard to the abnormal change in provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables. A summary of the results is contained in Table 12 (overleaf):  
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Table 12 – H2 to H14: Summary Findings 
 Main relationships 
o There is a significant positive association between the proportion of INEDs to 
the total board and the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables. H9 is therefore accepted. This was found in both the univariate 
and multiple regression analysis. 
o There is a significant negative association between executive incentive 
remuneration and the abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables. H5 is therefore accepted. This was found in multiple regression 
analysis and at the 10% level of significance in the univariate analysis. 
.  
 Weaker relationships 
o There is a negative association between the difference in gearing and the 
abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. This was found in 
both the univariate analysis at the 5% level and multiple regression analysis at 
the 10% level (H6) 
o There is a negative association between the difference in gross margin and the 
abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. This was only found 
in the univariate analysis. No relationship was found in the multiple regression 
analysis. 
o There is a positive association between the difference in net margin and the 
abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. This was only found 
in the multiple regression analysis at the 5% and 10% level and the direction 
of the relationship was not that of the direction hypothesised.  
o There is a positive association between earnings surprise and the direction of 
abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables. This was only found 
in the multiple regression analysis at the 10% level and the direction of the 
relationship was not that of the direction hypothesised.  
o Given the lack of consistency in the results of the weaker relationships, H3, H6, 
H7 and H8 cannot be accepted. 
 No relationships 
o On all other variables no relationship was detected. The following hypotheses 
cannot be accepted: 
 H2, consensus EPS growth  
 H4, existence of bonus plan 
 H10, proportion of non-executives to total audit committee 
 H11, number of governance non-compliance issues 
 H12, number of audit committee meetings 
 H13, auditor type 
 H14, audit specific fees 
 
4.2.2: Discussion of results of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 14 
 
The aim of these hypotheses was to examine the applicability of previously identified and 
alternative determinants of earnings management to the abnormal provision for credit losses 
on trade receivables amongst FTSE 350 companies.  
 
  
29 | P a g e  
 
Capital Market Variables – No Evidence  
The significance of capital market determinants, including analyst earnings expectations, is 
well documented in previous earnings management research (Healy and Wahlen, 1998). 
However, the findings of this study provide only limited evidence of a relationship between 
these variables (via the earnings surprise variable) and the abnormal provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables.  
 
Contractual Variables – Some Evidence   
Contractual determinants of earnings management examined in this study comprise the 
existence of a bonus plan, executive incentive remuneration and the difference in gearing.  
 
While the existence of a bonus plan variable displayed no significant relationship, the 
executive incentive remuneration variable exhibited a significant negative relationship in both 
univarite and multiple regression analysis with the direction of abnormal provision for credit 
losses on trade receivables. This result provides strong support for the findings of prior 
research including that of Healy (1985), Healy and Wahlen (1998), Chen (2006) and the 
management compensation hypothesis of positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). In the context of this study, the result suggests that executive level managers utilise 
abnormal under-provision for credit losses on trade receivables to inflate earnings where their 
total compensation is increasingly comprised of incentive remuneration contingent upon such 
earnings performance.  
 
The evidence is less convincing with respect to the difference in gearing variable. This 
variable is significant in the univariate analysis but only at the 10% level in the multivariate 
analysis. The results provide limited support that increasing levels of gearing are associated 
with abnormal under-provision for credit losses on trade receivables. This may explain the 
use of earnings inflation procedures to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants (Dechow et 
al, 1996).  
 
Margin Variables – No Evidence   
Although there was some weak evidence that the difference in the gross margin variable had 
a negative relationship with the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables, this was not a consistent result and could not be accepted. This result is contrary 
to the findings of Zhang (2006). In addition,  although the difference in net margin variable 
indicated significance in multiple regression analysis, this result was not consistent with the 
univariate analysis, while the direction of the relationship was also contrary to that 
hypothesised. 
 
Governance Variables – Some Evidence   
The intervening and mitigating effects of robust corporate governance structures on earnings 
management are widely acknowledged (Sebahattin and Harlan, 2009). Consistent with Lin et 
al (2006), no significant relationship is found between the number of audit committee 
meetings variable and the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables.  
 
However, the proportion of INEDs to the total board variable exhibited a significant positive 
(5% level) relationship with the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade 
receivables. This finding provides some evidence of decreasing earnings inflation activity as 
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the robustness of corporate governance structures increase, consistent with Dechow et al 
(1996), Beasley (1996), Peasnell et al (2005) and Sebahattin and Harlan (2009). This result 
also represents support for the mitigating effects of independent oversight on earnings 
inflation activity (via abnormal under-provision for credit losses on trade receivables 
specifically). 
  
Auditor Variables – No Evidence    
Large auditors with industry specialist knowledge are widely considered to be more effective 
in constraining the earnings management activity of their clients (Francis and Krishnan, 
1999). The findings of this study, upon initial examination, provide some support in this 
regard, with an apparent significant positive (5% level) relationship between the auditor type 
variable and the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables.  
 
However, the abnormal distribution of the auditor type (categorical) variable has resulted in 
the disregarding of this result. Given that 198 or 97 per cent of the final sample were audited 
by Big 4 firms, this variable is no longer effective in earnings management research. 
Contrasting with Frankel et al (2002), no significant relationship between the audit specific 
fees variable and the direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables is 
exhibited.  
 
Non Hypothesised Variables 
The Adj. R Square values resulting from the regression analyses examining research 
objective three range from 3.7 – 6.3 per cent, with a significant extent of the variation in the 
direction of abnormal provision for credit losses on trade receivables therefore explained by 
factors omitted from the model employed. This result is not surprising however, given that 
Dechow et al (2011) document the lack of power in earnings management models and the 
relatively low Adj. R Square values recorded in prior earnings management research; for 
example: Chen (2006), Adj R Square between 10% to 12%.  
 
Following the low Adj R Square the authors revised the model, including the previous period 
abnormal provision for credit losses as a control style variable. This variable was included on 
the basis that an over (or under) provision could be a reaction to the previous period’s 
provisioning activities. No prior expectation of the sign of this variable was set forth. A 
negative relationship could be explained by a reaction to the previous period’s experience – 
an over provision in previous period may be followed by an under provision in the current 
period. A positive relationship may be found in situations where companies continue with the 
behaviour from one period to the next – an over provision in the previous period may be 
followed be an over provision in the current period as companies are reluctant to change their 
provisioning behaviour (in this case an overly prudent approach). The results of these models 
are not presented but they did not add to the power of the model. When this variable was 
added to the model, the adjusted R Square value was 2.9% and the previous year’s abnormal 
provision was not a significant variable in the model.  
 
The overall decision to manage earnings (abnormally provide for credit losses on trade 
receivables) is a complex one; affected by the broader macroeconomic environment and 
sector specific variables but also significantly by the economic and political circumstances of 
a firm (Peltier-Rivest and Swirsky, 2000). While both the positive accounting and agency 
theories provide a firm foundation for the determinants of earnings management, the decision 
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to manage earnings ultimately comprises many variables that are simply non-linear and not 
quantifiable but qualitative in nature.  
5.0: Conclusion 
 
While the existence of abnormal under provision for credit losses on trade receivables was 
found, the results attempting to explain the existence of the abnormal under provision were 
discouraging. These disappointing results are compounded by the fact that many of the 
variables identified in the model were informed by past studies in the earnings management 
literature. How can this lack of results be explained, given the existing body of evidence? 
 The measure of earnings management employed (the abnormal provision for 
credit losses on trade receivable) is not effective. Companies that manage earnings 
have a variety of measures at their disposal; the abnormal provision for credit 
losses is just one measure. It is possible that the model developed and the sample 
selected is not powerful enough to capture the earnings management behaviour of 
companies.  
 Many of the earnings management studies tend to concentrate on companies in 
financial distress or companies that have been shown to have actually managed 
earnings (Dechow et al (1996), Jaggi and Lee (2002)). In this study, the sample 
was based on the FTSE 350 Index of companies, the majority of whom would be 
in good financial health, indeed; only 19 companies in the sample had negative net 
margin percentages. Thus, the companies that comprise the sample are less likely 
to manage earnings.  
 It is possible that the average company does not use the provision for credit losses 
to manage earnings. This is contrary to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) and we would posit, is an unlikely explanation. 
Alternatively, any under-provision may be justified, where the credit risk 
attaching to specific customers has declined significantly. However, given the 
period to which the research relates, it is unlikely that credit risk in general should 
be decreasing (Atradius (2012)).  
 
The work undertaken in this study can be extended in several directions. Those companies 
exhibiting extreme abnormal under-provision for credit losses on trade receivables could be 
examined across a broader spectrum of earnings quality indicators to ascertain the extent of 
overall earnings quality and earnings management activity. In addition, companies are now 
required to provide much greater levels of detail on their credit loss risks, for example: 
information on ‘receivables that are past due and impaired’ and ‘receivables that are past due 
but not impaired’. This may prove to be a much better indicator of earnings management 
activity – an index of the relationship between ‘receivables that are past due but not impaired’ 
and the actual provision for credit losses, as this gap widens then this may indicate the 
existence of earnings management. Finally, the response of capital markets to the abnormal 
provision for credit losses on trade receivables is worthy of further investigation.  
 
This study answered the call of McNichols and Wilson (1988) for further research of earnings 
management through singular accrual measures. On average, abnormal under provision for 
credit losses on trade receivables was found to exist amongst FTSE 350 companies, however 
we were unable to satisfactorily explain the existence of the abnormal under-provision from 
the perspective of the earnings management literature.  
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